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Introduction 
The transformation of Chinese football under the aegis of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Football Dream” 
(中国足球梦) illuminates the party-state’s domestic aspirations and modus operandi. The latest 
iteration in a long line of football reform plans is being used by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a tool to serve broad economic 
and socio-political ends, including promoting public health, well-being and active lifestyles, 
generating feelings of national unity and pride, stimulating middle-class consumption, inculcating 
social cohesion, encouraging patriotic citizenship and forging a shared national identity. The utility 
of the sport as a vehicle explains why the Chinese leadership has invested significant financial and 
reputational capital in the top-down direction of football development. Yet, the competing motives 
of diverse organizations, institutions, private commercial actors involved in the execution of a 
transformative reform program, and the agency of individual citizens, whether football fans, 
players or consumers, mean the state cannot simply will a successful football industry and culture 
into existence. There is an articulation between the needs of the state and the public and private 
institutions that respond and contribute to state projects to advance their own interests. Studying 
this articulation, through the specific case of football reform, reveals the complexities of policy-
making and politics in contemporary China. In their application of Appadurai’s (1996) work on 
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cultural economy, Yu et al. examine how the coalescing of people, finance, images and ideology 
create “football-scapes” imbued with “new systems of meaning, power, capital, and consumer 
identities from which the state, and sport therein, are articulated” (2017: 4). Yu et al. (2017) is a 
compelling study of the role of football in China’s engagement with cultural globalization, and 
seeking to extend this pioneering work we explore a more explicitly political dimension implicated 
in Chinese sport, namely the relationship between football and state-building, national identity and 
citizenship.  
         China’s engagement with football is complicated by its evolving status, first as a 
Communist country and subsequently as a reforming socialist economy, a rapidly modernizing 
country and an authoritarian regime. There are similarities (and legacies) between China’s 
organization of sport during the Mao era and other Communist countries, notably the Soviet Union 
(Edelman, 1993; Riordan, 2007), and patriotism and propaganda are a feature of numerous 
Communist regimes’ treatment of sport, like North Korea (Lee & Bairner, 2009). However, 
reform-era developments in Chinese football have relatively little in common with post-Soviet 
states, where chaotic professionalization led to endemic corruption and the emasculation of 
domestic football structures (Molnar, 2007). Football in China is not an incubator of violent 
nationalism or ethnic conflict as it has been in other reforming socialist nations (Mills, 2009). 
Neither has football become a site for anti-state mobilization as it has in other developing nations 
like Brazil, despite sharing similar social conditions such as inequality and corruption (Goldblatt, 
2014). Other authoritarian regimes have sought “soft power” gains through association with 
football, particularly countries in the Gulf (Thani & Heenan, 2017), and many countries have 
adopted policies to promote sport to tackle health issues and deliver elite sporting success (Grix & 
Carmichael, 2012). Other nations, notably Japan and the US, have launched new football leagues 
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and invested heavily in the recruitment of foreign expertise (Collins, 2006; Horne, 1999). Football 
in Europe and elsewhere is similarly no stranger to the involvement of political figures and a 
business-football-politics nexus embodied by individuals like Silvio Berlusconi and Roman 
Abramovich (Doidge, 2015). While individual aspects of China’s football experience have 
corollaries elsewhere, taken as a whole, its experience is distinct from other nations. To anchor our 
analysis, therefore, we use the concept of symbolic power, a lens that helps us make sense of the 
totality of the Chinese approach to football by treating it as a “field-spanning” socio-cultural and 
politico-economic sphere. The article proceeds in three stages. We first present an overview of the 
role of football and sport through the history of the PRC, before analyzing current practices 
manifest in multiple policy documents and accompanying discourses and praxis that underpin 
China’s hybrid state-corporatist approach to football.      
  
From Sport to Citizenship 
The symbolic resonance of football in China goes beyond the appreciation of sport. At the domestic 
level it is implicated in China’s ongoing pursuit of modernity, the Party-state’s narrative of national 
development and, ultimately, regime legitimacy. Such linkages are longstanding. Sport during the 
Mao era was highly politicized, as it was in other Communist nations. Sporting prowess, especially 
demonstrations of supremacy over other nations, was conceived as “a manifestation of ideological 
supremacy” (Dong & Mangan, 2001: 82). From the founding of the PRC, football was “a symbol 
of modernity; a talisman of topicality; a statement of intent” (Dong & Mangan, 2001: 79) The 
leadership of the new Communist state held the ambition for China to become a footballing power, 
a position the predecessor Republic of China regime briefly occupied in Asia during the 1920s. A 
centralized elite sports system was incorporated into the planned economy by the mid-1950s, but 
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suffered substantial disruption during the catastrophic Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution. Upon adopting “opening and reform” as its mantra after Mao’s death, China re-
engaged with international sport and began the gradual and experimental process of dismantling 
the centrally administered football system. Newly enriched, but still desirous of validation (Deng, 
2008), the contemporary party-state has reanimated football as a vehicle for its nation building 
projects. The current iteration, launched in 2014, falls under the aegis of the Chinese Dream (中
国梦) and Core Socialist Values (社会主义核心价值观) (Gow, 2017), defining components of 
Xi’s national development and citizenship discourses that were incorporated into the PRC 
Constitution at the 13th National People’s Congress in March 2018 (Lu, 2018). With ambitions to 
play an expanded global leadership role and accelerated efforts to recalibrate the manufacturing-
led model that facilitated economic take-off, China has entered a “New Era of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics” (新时代中国特色社会主义) (Peters, 2017). Codified at the 19th Party 
Congress in November 2017, the New Era is set to be the motif for the foreseeable future now that 
state and party term-limits have been formally removed, allowing Xi Jinping to remain in power 
beyond his originally allotted two five-year terms (Bader, 2018). A flourishing domestic football 
industry, combined with internationally competitive performance have a role to play in the New 
Era through promotion of domestic consumption, civic participation, cultural engagement and 
national pride. Like other national level projects, development of the football sector must proceed 
in a manner deemed acceptable to the increasingly proscriptive Chinese authorities under Xi’s 
centralized leadership. One circumscription applicable to national sport policy relates to the 
contribution it makes to the formation of state-approved notions of Chinese national identity and 
the delineation of citizenship. For guidance on how to approach this development we turn to the 
social theorist Pierre Bourdieu.  
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Symbolic Power and Stratification: Appropriating Bourdieu 
The utility of Bourdieu’s theorizing with regard to China lies in the concepts of symbolic power 
and symbolic violence, which provide useful lenses to frame the top-down creation of cultural 
industries, the emergence of consumer culture, and the superior-subordinate relationship between 
the state and the private sector. Specifically, Bourdieu’s concepts allow us to consider the impact 
of these factors on state-led stratification in contemporary China, and post-socialist contexts more 
broadly, which serves to define and determine the parameters of citizenship. Calhoun (2006) 
argues that Bourdieu’s work is situated in the sociology of development, beginning with his earliest 
studies of the Kabyle in Algeria, whereby French colonialism sought to incorporate Algeria into 
its own sphere of capitalist relations. In doing so, French colonialists essentially stratified the 
Algerian context, producing and reproducing inequalities which served to define and delimit social 
groups and include or exclude them from society. It is this process of the state exercising a 
monopoly over “symbolic power” to determine the characteristics of acceptable and legitimate 
citizenship, which we aim to explore in relation to China. A key aspect of China’s post-socialist 
context is the pragmatic inter-marriage of state industrial strategy and market forces – a union of 
political authoritarianism with economic reforms. The resulting and continuing emergence of 
Chinese consumer culture provides an arena that cannot be effectively explored without the 
introduction of critical theories of capitalism. Critical and social theory are useful tools in the 
Chinese context because they help us examine complex dynamics of state power and state 
legitimacy, the interplay between the state and private sector, and the role of consumerism and 
cultural industries as arenas for performing citizenship and securing state legitimacy.  
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Symbolic power is a defining component in Bourdieu’s political sociology and 
examination of state legitimacy. Bourdieu’s notion of power is a combination of physical violence 
exercised through the repressive state apparatus of political society, and symbolic violence, 
realized through the ideological state apparatus of civil society (Burawoy, 2015). Symbolic 
domination is “a particularly insidious form of violence”, being both everywhere and nowhere, as 
“we fail to recognize its very existence” (Schubert, 2008). In developing this concept, Bourdieu 
emphasizes the characteristic of misrecognition, where symbolic power normalizes hierarchical 
power relations, rendering the dominated incapable of questioning the prevailing order (Jung, 
2004). It plays a subtle but influential role in legitimizing hierarchies through a process of 
establishing standards to measure identity and position, including gender, race, ethnicity and class 
(Swartz, 2013). For Bourdieu, the essence of symbolic power is the capacity to consecrate or reveal 
social groups (Bourdieu, 1989). The ability to delimit groups constitutes an exhibition of symbolic 
power, creating a perceived hierarchy and conferring legitimacy on the state via the widespread 
recognition and consequent acceptance of the ruling elite’s world view. Applied to the context of 
football development in China, the utility of Bourdieu’s conceptual lens lies in elucidating how 
emerging cultural industries facilitate the creation of citizens and the stratification of society 
through processes of “consecration and revelation” (Ho & Fung, 2016). Contemporary China 
provides a fertile context to explore state-building through the effective operationalization of 
symbolic power in both the domestic (the focus of this article) and international contexts (e.g. 
Cheng, 2017; Vangeli, 2018; Zhang, 2018). The Chinese state, broadly defined as the government 
of the PRC under the direction and leadership of the CCP, controls a sophisticated repressive 
apparatus and dominates the ideological sphere including the media, internet and education system. 
The Chinese state monopolizes symbolic power, determining the forms of symbolic capital which 
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can be bestowed on (or withdrawn from) agents across all sectors of society. A reservoir of 
symbolic capital is available to organizations and individuals that participate in state ordained 
projects. In the case of football, the project entails the creation of a quasi-cultural industry, realized 
through the mobilization of national, provincial and local governments, and the extensive 
contribution of the private sector. More than pure economic activity, the cultural industries are 
particularly potent incubators of symbolic power and the distribution of symbolic capital, and in 
the work of Bourdieu, Adorno and other critical scholars, associated with the ultimate 
disempowerment of citizens vis-a-vis the state (Susen, 2011). 
  
Sport and State-Building in the reform era 
Sport has played a significant role in state efforts to build consensus and enhance perceptions of 
legitimacy in the PRC. Deng Xiaoping’s decision to “open to the world” (对外开放), combined 
with rapid economic progress in the post-1978 reform era, incentivized and enabled China’s 
hosting of multiple international sporting events. The Chinese leadership has been explicit about 
the connection between hosting, performing well on the international sporting stage and burnishing 
regime-supportive feelings of national pride (Xu, 2009). A succession of events was used to signal 
China’s re-joining international society after the self-imposed isolation of the Mao years and 
diplomatic exile that followed the bloody denouement of the Democracy Spring movement in and 
around Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Beijing and Shenzhen hosted the Summer Universiade 
(2001, 2011), Shanghai, Macao, Hong Kong and Tianjin convened the East Asian Games (1993, 
2005, 2009 and 2013), and the Asian Games were held in Beijing and Guangzhou (1990, 2010). 
The major prize was the Olympic Games held in Beijing in 2008. The state capitalized on the first 
global mega-event to be held in post-reform China as an opportunity to demonstrate the country’s 
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progress, to generate respect internationally and instill pride domestically. The Beijing Games, 
underwritten by a $45 billion state investment in infrastructure, security and decade-long strategic 
targeting of high-yield sports that led to China’s dominance of the medal table, were suffused with 
symbolism propagated through constant media narratives. Disruptions to the international torch 
relay by human rights organizations and Free Tibet activists prompted waves of patriotic 
indignation. The disruptions to the relay in Paris led to a widespread boycott of French supermarket 
chain Carrefour (BBC, 2008; Jacobs, 2008). Notwithstanding Western criticism over heavy 
handed urban redevelopment and restrictions on free speech, which in any case were censored in 
the Chinese media (Economy & Segal, 2008), the Games’ significantly burnished the national 
pride narrative central to the patriotic education curriculum adopted after Tiananmen (Price & 
Dayan, 2009). The spectacular architecture at the Olympic Park, director Zhang Yimou’s stunning 
opening ceremony invoking the glories of Chinese culture and PRC athletes’ sporting superiority 
made significant contributions to the Chinese national imaginary. These successes were 
particularly resonant at a time when the nation was reeling from a devastating earthquake that 
killed more than 80 thousand people. The fact that many of the victims were children who died in 
collapsed schools due to corrupt officials siphoning construction funds, was heavily censored. 
Against the backdrop of the Wenchuan earthquake, the flawless Olympics conferred legitimacy 
on the state through the symbolic realization of national objectives, while simultaneously 
rewarding participating individuals, institutions and organizations with symbolic capital. Flushed 
with this success, soon after the Olympics the state’s attention turned to back to football, long 
conceived as a symbolic power resource that had gone untapped.  
  
Football in the Post-Reform Era 
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In 2009, in the afterglow of the Beijing Games held the year before, Hu Jintao declared China’s 
intention to become a global sports power (Tan, 2015). At a subsequent planning meeting, Liu 
Yandong made the case for the special role of football in satisfying the spiritual and cultural 
demands of the Chinese people (China Daily, 2018; see also Tan et al., 2016). While China is not 
widely seen as a “football nation” outside the country, the sport has long had a special resonance 
for Chinese people because it is widely perceived as the world’s game and successful participation 
as a marker of national status. China’s lacklustre performance in football competition “taps into 
deep Chinese insecurities that, no matter what great leaps the country has made or grudging 
deference it has earned through economic or military might, China remains an inferior power” 
(Wan, 2015: np). While the women’s side won the Asian Cup in 1997 and finished second at the 
World Cup two years later, the men’s national representative teams have been a source of national 
angst, with losses sometimes provoking serious rioting (Bridges, 2008). Dominance of the now 
defunct Far Eastern Games, when the Republic of China won nine titles between 1915 and 1934, 
has never been replicated by the PRC. The men’s national team has qualified twice for the 
Olympics (1988, 2008) and participated in a single World Cup (2002), failing to win a match and 
scoring a solitary goal in nine matches. Routine failure to qualify for international tournaments is 
compounded by periodic humiliations, such as the “615 Massacre” (a 5:1 loss to Thailand in 2015) 
and the “519 incident” (a defeat to Hong Kong that prevented China’s advance in the qualifying 
tournament for the 1986 World Cup). Poor performance has created public pressure on the football 
authorities, and players have been targeted for poor attitudes and application, despite the patriotic 
curriculum that is a “constant theme in the education of elite athletes” (Tan & Bairner, 2010). 
The futility of the men’s national team has prompted a succession of reform plans for the 
national football infrastructure. Soon into the reform era, defeat in the qualifying phase of the 1980 
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Olympics led to a new youth system and youth team structure initiated the following year. The 
“519” defeat to Hong Kong was the stimulus for significant reforms to the administration and 
organization of the sport along European lines, including the introduction of a professional club 
system and establishing football companies as commercial agents (Tan & Bairner, 2010). Later 
failure to qualify for the 1990 World Cup prompted a “Ten Year Millennium Plan”, part of which 
was a coordinated effort to send young players abroad to receive training and to increase the 
number of foreign coaches and players in the Chinese domestic league. Xi Jinping himself first 
revealed his ambitions to strengthen Chinese football on a visit to Germany in 2009. Soon before 
his rise to General Secretary of the Communist Party, Xi’s targets had become more concrete, 
expressed to Korean politicians as qualification and hosting of the World Cup. Operationalizing 
these objectives would require more systematic investment in grassroots facilities and youth 
training, further institutional reform of the organization of domestic and national football structures 
and financial burden-sharing with the private sector. The State Council thus convened a conference 
in 2011 to identify pathways to involve private investors, notably Wanda CEO Wang Jianlin, one 
of China’s richest private entrepreneurs. Wang agreed to invest 500 million RMB in a strategic 
partnership with the Chinese Football Association (CFA), including 65 million RMB per annum 
to sponsor the Chinese Super League. During Xi’s first term from 2012 to 2017, Chinese football 
expanded its domestic and international profiles in large part due to the investments, acquisitions 
and marquee player signings facilitated by entrepreneurs like Wang. Behind the scenes, however, 
the Xi administration was focused on devising a systematic plan for the development of football 
from grassroots to the national team. 
  
A New Era of Football Reform? 
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Three official policy documents released at intervals between 2014 and 2016 formalized the 
parameters and pathways of Xi’s “football dream.” In 2014, the State Council issued an opinion 
on “Accelerating the Development of the Sports Industry to Promote Sport Consumption” (国务
院关于加快发展体育产业促进体育消费的若干意见) (PRC State Council, 2014), which set out 
an industrial vision for Chinese sport with a projected domestic sports economy worth up to 
US$800 billion by 2025.[37] It was followed by “The Overall Reform Plan for the Reform and 
Development of Chinese Football” (中国足球改革发展总体方案) (PRC State Council, 2015) 
issued in 2015, which proposed the professionalization and streamlining of the institutional 
architecture, including greater autonomy in planning and operations for the CFA. Finally, in 2016, 
the National Reform and Development Commission (国家发展改革委) specified a “Medium to 
Long Term Development Plan 2016-50” (中国足球中长期发展规划 2016—2050年; hereafter, 
National Football Plan) (NDRC, 2016a), containing the targets, means and benchmarks for a 
projected world-class football power. 
         The short (2016-20), medium (2021-30) and long-term (2031-50) phases of the National 
Football Plan lay out key objectives and milestones. The short-term goal is the establishment of 
football as a key component in compulsory education, with a stated target of 30 million school 
children actively involved in football initiatives at 20,000 football schools (全国特色足球学校). 
The emphasis on grassroots initiatives is manifest in the expanded target of 50 million people 
involved in football by 2020, and the construction of 70,000 national football facilities nationwide. 
The medium-term objectives (中期目标) require an expansion of football pitch provision across 
China, resulting in a minimum of one for every 10,000 citizens. During the medium phase, the 
emphasis is on developing infrastructure for campus football, amateur participation and 
consolidating professional leagues. The ambition for the national men’s team is to become a 
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leading force in Asian football by 2030. The overarching goal for the long-term phase (长期目标) 
is to establish China as a “world-class football power,” aligning with broader national objectives 
to establish a nation characterized as powerful (富强), civilized (文明) and harmonious (和谐) by 
the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049 (Gow, 2017). Aside from overarching 
goals for each phase, the National Football Plan provides 21 key objectives (重点任务分工) which 
involve the mobilization of several ministries, commissions, administrative and regulatory bodies 
and branches of national, provincial and local government. These goals are designated to be 
achieved by 2020 (2020年底前完成) or through vaguer “sustained implementation” (持续实施). 
Table 1 sets out the short-term objectives as incorporated into the 13th Five Year Plan (十三五) at 
the National People’s Congress in March 2016 (Melton, 2015; NDRC, 2016b). The medium and 
long-term objectives currently lack specific road maps, which will likely be developed into more 
coherent projects and initiatives in the 14th Five Year Plan.  
Table 1: Objectives and timeframe 
(INSERT TABLE 1)  
 
The National Football Plan, requires the mobilization and deployment of a significant coalition 
of state institutions. The State Council’s Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on 
Football Reform and Development (足改部际联席会议办公室) is the coordinating body 
overseeing the 21 stated objectives, with each objective identifying other responsible bodies. 
Overall, action and collaboration is required from 11 Ministries, 4 State Council Commissions, 5 
government agencies, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the 
Central Bank, and the CCP Propaganda Department (CCPPD), in addition to a range of bureaus, 
agencies and commissions at the provincial and local government levels. The executive, 
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legislature and judiciary are all implicated in efforts to develop the required infrastructure and 
institutionalization, while the CCPPD’s remit is to utilize state media and the extensive array of 
communication channels in its purview to “foster football culture” (培育足球文化). Table 2 
identifies the various state authorities specifically referenced in the National Football Plan and 
the corresponding objectives they are responsible for as detailed in Table 1 above. 
 
Table 2: Institutional responsibilities       
 
(INSERT TABLE 2) 
  
Medium to long term plans (中长期规划) emerged as a policy format distinct from the five-year 
plans towards the end of the first term of the Hu administration (2002-2007), with medium to long 
terms developed for Science and Technology (2006-2020); Education (2010-2020); Human 
Resources (2010-2020); Youth Development (2016-2025); Automotive Industry (2017-2025). The 
aim was to prevent inconsistencies in policy design and implementation during periodic changes 
in party and state leadership positions. The National Medium to Long Term Education 
Development Plan (国家中长期教育发展规划 2010-2020), for instance, was adopted to ensure 
policy coherence between the Hu and Xi administrations. The expansive timescale of the National 
Football Plan ensures more consistent policy over a projected seven full Five-Year Plans. While 
launched under CCP and PRC leadership cycles formulated at the 18th CCP National Party 
Congress (2012-2016) and 12th PRC National People’s Congress (2013-2018), the National 
Football Plan will end during the leadership formulated at the 25th CCP National Party Congress 
(2047-2051) and 19th PRC National People’s Congress (2048-2052). These policy documents also 
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constitute the materiel of symbolic power, in this case shaping discourse on football reform and 
framing it as part of the PRC’s broader teleological modernization project. Under the system of 
democratic centralism, individual political figures derive their symbolic authority from 
compliance and adherence to the vision laid out in official discourse. While the policy documents 
themselves embody the symbolic power of the state, “symbolic violence” is manifest in the 
dissemination of the football reform narrative as it is rolled out across state media, in the speeches 
of government cadres, and in widely reported developments in the private sector. It is through 
repeated expressions of consensus that notions of nation state, shared identity, patriotism and 
citizenship are reinforced and inculcated through state policy discourse. However, the 
implementation of policy is necessarily decentralized through delegation to subnational actors that 
form a national-local-national policy loop. 
The central leadership has set out a grand vision and a vague framework to be filled-in 
incrementally. This form of emergent strategy is a hallmark of policymaking in the reform era, 
which allows for experimentation, responsiveness to unintended consequences and adjustments to 
ensure “stability.” It requires the outsourcing of policy operationalization and implementation to 
government ministries, provincial and municipal governments, State Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
and private businesses. As revealed by their behavior, these actors often have different 
interpretations, priorities and strategies to those of central leaders. Furthermore, significant 
coordination problems are exacerbated by bureaucratic competition, institutional bottlenecks, 
corruption and ever-present political imperatives. Like state-ordained projects in science, 
education and the creative industries, the development of football is driven by investment in 
infrastructure, industrial clustering and the centrally-directed but distributed marshalling of capital, 
institutional capacity and human resources. As a component of China’s hybrid system of market 
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socialism, it is a strategy that has led to rapid gains across numerous sectors, but also over-capacity, 
investment bubbles and widespread corruption. 
The National Football Plan sets objectives to be achieved within given timeframes, but 
provides limited information on strategies to achieve these objectives. This is attributable to the 
cascade effect of industrial policy in China, whereby national level objectives are realized through 
the cumulative achievements of different levels of geographic governance. This effect can clearly 
be seen when examining various football plans at the local and provincial levels. Not all sub-
national plans are made publicly available, while some provinces and municipalities have yet to 
complete their policy responses. Provinces generally issue a medium-to-long term football 
development plan (足球中长期发展规划 ), while cities at the municipal, sub-provincial 
(prefecture) and county (sub-prefecture) levels issue a document called the Overall Program of 
Football Reform and Development (足球改革发展总体方案).  However, this is not entirely 
consistent and these two different names generally refer to a document which sets out how the 
locality in question responds and contributes to the pursuit of goals laid out in the National Football 
Plan. Examining policy documents at different levels reveals how a policy loop originating at the 
national level passes down to the local level, before being assessed to ensure the cumulative effect 
is consistent with national objectives. Taking the example of National Football Plan objective to 
establish 20,000 National Specialised Football Schools (全国特色足球学校) with 30 million 
school-age children participating in football by 2020, Table 3 illustrates how national football 
policy cascades down to inform policy goals at the local level. At the city level, specific figures 
on school-age children participation are not given, though Lanzhou outlines plans for 80% 
participation across 130 specialized football schools by 2020; Shenzhen focuses on a target of 
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10,000 pupils registered with amateur football teams by 2020, and Shijiazhuang outlines plans for 
separate girls’ football schools. 
 
Table 3: National Specialized Football Schools (全国特色足球学校)  
 
(INSERT TABLE 3)  
  
Football and business 
In response to political signaling, China’s rapidly professionalizing and commercializing sports 
industry has witnessed significant growth, with corporations seeking opportunities for sustainable 
businesses and accompanying revenue streams. Major conglomerates like Wanda Corporation, 
Evergrande and Fosun have actively pursued profitable investments in football domestically and 
overseas (Chadwick, 2017). Chinese commercial investments are often influenced by political 
calculi, and are often embedded in a network of politicised relationships and adherent to the 
conventions of guanxi (Fei, Hamilton, & Wang, 1992; Graham & Lam, 2003). The private sector 
has demonstrated willingness to contribute to the state’s football project, and has accrued financial, 
political and symbolic capital through its participation. The distribution of the latter form of capital 
constitutes the monopolisation of symbolic power by the Chinese party-state, and it can be awarded 
or denied as illustrated by the admonishment of private corporations since mid-2017, when the 
state deemed their activities (mainly over-investment) as contravening the spirit and objectives 
outlined in the National Football Plan. 
Founding CEO of commercial property developer and mall operator Wanda, Wang Jianlin 
is emblematic of the interaction between the state and private capital in football. A former Dalian 
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government official, one-time associate of Dalian Mayor Bo Xilai and a veteran of the People’s 
Liberation Army, Wang began his investment in football during the early stages of 
professionalization. As owner of the local former dockyard club, Wang led Dalian Wanda to four 
of the first five Jia-A titles between 1994 and 1999 (Stead, 2016). Based in the (post-)industrial 
northeast, where football traditionally enjoyed great popularity, the club put China’s new 
professional league on the map in Asia by reaching the final and semi-final of the Asian Club 
Championship in 1997 and 1998 (Weinberg, 2015). Wilson (Wilson, 2013) documents Wang’s 
sale of the club in 2000, with the league falling into decline and suffering from endemic corruption 
scandals. His successor as owner of the Dalian club, was also an entrepreneur with political 
connections, Xu Ming, which helped his rise and precipitated his downfall. Xu cultivated a close 
relationship with Bo Xilai, a rising political star in the Party, and suffered the consequences when 
Bo fell out of favour with Xi Jinping. Both ended their careers in jail, where Xu died in 2015. Xu’s 
club fell into decline and ultimately merged with another Dalian club (Herman, 2016). 
Despite having sold his interest in the Dalian club, Wang emerged as a key entrepreneurial 
lieutenant for the state, both domestically and internationally. Wanda purchased Infront Sports and 
Media, the Swiss-based company run by former FIFA president Sepp Blatter’s nephew, which 
holds and manages media marketing rights for major international sports events and organizations, 
including the World Cup. Wanda then took a 20% stake in blue-chip Spanish club Atletico Madrid, 
and built the stunning new Wanda Metropolitano stadium. Seeking to diversify away from China’s 
overheated real estate market, Wanda bought numerous high profile western leisure and sport 
properties, including the Iron Triathalon, luxury yacht maker Sunseeker International, the 
American cinema chain AMC Theatres, a Parisian amusement park and Legendary Entertainment. 
Wang, who bought back in to Dalian football in 2017, like other entrepreneurs with significant 
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football investments like Alibaba’s Jack Ma and Suning’s Zhang Jindong, sees sport as an 
entertainment commodity (Chadwick, Widdop, & Parnell, 2017). In his keynote to the second 
China Sports Industry Forum, held as part of the 7th Caixin Summit in 2016 (第七届财新峰会暨
第二届中国体育产业论坛) (Wanda Group, 2016), Wang acknowledged his desire to create a 
global entertainment and leisure empire, calling for the integration of sports with commerce, media, 
tourism, infrastructure development and construction. The business interests of CSL and League 
One club owners in the 2017 season is marked by concentrations in property development and real 
estate. China Fortune Land Development, Evergrande and R&F, for instance, are construction and 
real estate companies that have invested in Guangzhou and Hebei football clubs. These companies 
have benefited from local government grants of land for the development of football and related 
leisure and entertainment facilities. Since urban land is a valuable commodity, buying a football 
club can be a valuable equity investment in addition to generating symbolic capital through widely 
recognized involvement in state-approved projects, and building political capital with municipal 
and provincial governments keen to demonstrate their commitment to implementing Xi’s football 
development plans. Acquiring overseas football assets, upon Xi’s signalling, has enabled Chinese 
businesses and entrepreneurs to make a significant global statement about Brand China, but the 
government’s attempt to rein in “irrational acquisitions” since 2017 demonstrates that the state and 
business are involved in a “negotiation” over the interpretation and operationalization of policy 
goals. Part of a broader crackdown on over-leveraged companies initiated by the General Office 
of the State Council (PRC State Council, 2017), not even someone as trusted and politically 
connected as Wang escaped unscathed, with Wanda forced to sell most of its stake in Atletico and 
other assets. 
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Numerous football investors have been rebuked by central government for the 
extravagance of their overseas expenditure and high transfer fees paid to bring marquee player 
signings to the CSL. Responding to concerns about external currency outflows and liquidity 
problems that have characterised other Chinese industrial sectors (Balding, 2017), the government 
enforced a taxation rule upon CSL clubs whereby overseas player signings were subjected to the 
imposition of a 100% tax, with consequent revenues in turn being allocated to developmental 
activities in Chinese football (de Menezes, 2017). Despite these policy interventions to “correct” 
what was effectively an edict to private business to invest in football, the interest of entrepreneurs 
and enterprises in football and the expansion of international linkages and investments are part of 
the broader globalization of Chinese capital (Connell, 2018). These rebukes offer increasing 
evidence that the Xi administration will only convey symbolic capital upon private sector actors 
which comply with and contribute to state objectives in a manner deemed fit by the state. The 
value of this symbolic capital to companies lies in continued access to opportunities across the full 
scope of commercial activities, with the state using it as leverage to advance the realization of 
National Football Plan objectives. 
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
At the heart of China’s football development is an articulation between the motivations of the state 
and the motivations of the private sector. The state occupies the leading role, and is concerned 
with the maintenance, reinforcement and operationalization of symbolic power through football. 
The National Football Plan and associated policy initiatives at the provincial, municipal and local 
levels seek to exercise symbolic power in two distinct ways. First, they present objectives in the 
short (2020), medium (2030) and long-term (2050) phases, which define the overarching trajectory 
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for development. Second, they create opportunities for the private sector to accumulate various 
forms of social, cultural and economic capital in exchange for their contribution to the realization 
of project objectives. The creation of these opportunities encourages both cooperation and 
competition among private firms. The alignment of interests between various state and private 
sectors is synergetic yet distinct, and in need of articulation. That is, the intended objectives of the 
firms involved in football projects across China are to strengthen their own position, not 
necessarily to deliver a world class football industry. Conversely, the state’s intention is that the 
objectives outlined in the National Football Plan will be achieved as a result of competition 
between diverse public and private sector actors. The state does not mind who contributes to the 
achievement of policy objectives, only that all objectives are achieved within the stated timeframes. 
In this respect, there is often an “ontological hiatus” (Bhaskar, 2014) between the National Football 
Plan and developments on the ground. The Chinese football dream narrative and policy framework 
provides the necessary conditions for intentional agential activity, yet the football dream does not 
exist independently of agential activity, nor is it an intentional product of agential activity. To 
paraphrase Bhaskar (2014), agential activity does not intentionally create the Chinese football 
dream, but rather reproduces and transforms it as an unintended consequence of actors pursuing 
various forms of capital specific to their own field of activity. The discourse of the Chinese football 
dream is a pre-condition for the activity which leads to its reproduction and transformation and 
propels development along a trajectory deemed desirable by the state. The intentional objectives 
of individual and institutional agency are the accumulation of symbolic capital, which may take 
the form of economic, social or cultural capital pursued through participation in any aspect of 
football activity, made available across various fields, resulting from the emergence of this cultural 
industry. 
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         The Chinese state is not only exercising symbolic power through differentiating, 
commodifying and classifying culture (Susen, 2011), it is limiting the potential for mass culture, 
which functions as a form of social distinction, to emerge. Where bottom-up, mass culture 
movements do emerge, they are swiftly suppressed, allowing the state’s own cultural industries to 
develop unchallenged. In China, there is little room for mass football culture amid an industry 
engineered to commodify football and imbue it with symbolic capital. While Bourdieu argues that 
the state’s role is to act as a referee on the monopolization of symbolic violence, in China’s 
authoritarian context the state retains a monopoly itself and is actively expanding cultural 
industries to further exercise symbolic violence. In Xi Jinping’s New Era, culture is being 
unleashed as both a source of power and as an instrument of domination through the effective 
creation of cultural industries. Football, and sport more generally, is being mobilized as part of the 
operationalization of cultural power to cement state legitimacy. As cultural capital (D. Swartz, 
2012), football takes several different forms: as embodied cultural capital in the form of Chinese 
Super League competition, live broadcasts, highlights shows; the men’s and women’s national 
team matches and other commodified football products; as objectified cultural capital in the form 
of stadia, football facilities, sports insurance products, sporting equipment that are used by cultural 
participants; and in institutionalized cultural capital through campus football initiatives, amateur 
leagues, varsity competitions which are convertible to other forms of capital through credentials. 
This analysis echoes a key argument presented by Yu et al. where football is commodified by the 
state as “an eminently consumable aspect of everyday (physical) cultural life” where the citizen-
consumer is “called into action by the state to perform on behalf of nationalist modernization” 
(2017:20). In short, football is being commodified into forms of cultural capital which are 
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consumed, utilized or achieved, yet which are being made available through an imposed cultural 
industry created via industrial policy and the mobilization of the private sector. 
The sustainable development of the Chinese football industry and culture requires the 
enthusiastic participation of Chinese citizens on several levels: as supporters of clubs and national 
teams, as players in campus football and amateur leagues, and as consumers of football and related 
products and services. The interaction between the state and the private sector is similarly crucial 
to the creation of a vibrant footballing landscape for civic participation and consumption in a vast 
array of footballing activities. As Yu et al argue:  
In the conception of modern, post-socialist China in and through football, the nation is 
not only told a story about itself but is actively engaged in the dominions of 
participatory and consumer-based citizenship, where to play, watch, or even support 
the national team or the programs initiated around football is to engage with discourses 
and cultural logics of the aspirant Chinese state. (2017: 20) 
The National Football Plan mobilizes the private sector through its own self-interest and desire to 
engage in symbolic projects, terraforming the spatial geography of civic engagement and shaping 
the terrain upon which citizenship can be expressed through football. Schools, colleges and 
universities will become increasingly prominent alongside the proliferation of Sino-foreign 
initiatives in football training. Construction companies like Wanda will develop not only football 
stadia and facilities, but also the accompanying shopping complexes, hotels, transport 
infrastructure and landscaping which will surround them. Online content creators and aggregators 
will, through social media and video streaming platforms provide on-demand coverage and 
analysis of domestic football, international matches and other prominent football leagues (Long, 
2017; Associated Press, 2016). Electronics retailers and retail platforms, including Suning and 
Alibaba stand to benefit through sales of home and mobile electronics sales, while insurance 
companies, including current Chinese Super League sponsors Ping An Insurance take advantage 
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of opportunities detailed in the National Football Plan to provide tailored financial products and 
services. As the commercial power of China’s conglomerates are mobilized, the creation of a civic 
football space will extend beyond the thousands of football pitches currently appearing around the 
country to permeate China’s digital environment, reaching China’s citizens through smartphones, 
TVs and other devices. 
The implications of this project for Chinese people, and more broadly across society, must 
be taken against the wider context of developments in and across other arenas of China’s 
ideological state apparatus. When taken alongside legislative developments impacting media, 
entertainment, education and NGO’s, we can perceive a highly restrictive ideational landscape 
forming. From the perspective of the CCP, this is a consolidation of ideational power via a 
configuration of legislative and regulatory moves which delimit the boundaries of acceptable 
citizenship, shape discourse and disincentivize any notions of Chinese citizenship which compete 
with their own vision. Legislation and regulation constitute a coercive rearguard action which is 
then complemented with a cultural industry which allows for consensual expressions of citizenship 
within the boundaries laid down by the state. For Chinese people, the arenas for expression through 
consumption are becoming more sophisticated, yet, through a combination of prescription and 
proscription, the parameters of acceptable citizenship within those arenas is defined according to 
the prevailing doctrine of Xi’s New Era. 
The PRC’s football project reinforces the state’s monopoly on symbolic power in a number 
of key ways, providing new channels to perpetrate symbolic violence both reinforcing and 
enhancing the performance legitimacy that has been a feature of the post-reform era. Most 
importantly, it will establish a space for citizens to actively participate in the Chinese Dream 
through non-political activity, allow citizens to express or “perform” their identity in a manner 
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approved by the state, and continue to develop a new sector to facilitate China’s shift to a 
consumer-driven economy. It is through this process that symbolic power is exercised: through the 
conferral of symbolic capital on participating agents and actors. This, in turn, results in the 
construction of new channels between the state and the citizenry where symbolic violence 
reinforces misrecognition through the strengthening of perceptions of state legitimacy and notions 
of shared identity.  In this sense, football becomes a key feature of Xi’s “New Era of Socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” as both a driver of China’s shift to a consumer-driven economy and 
as a potentially significant source of cultural power aimed at fostering consent and citizenship 
identity.  
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Table 1: Objectives and timeframe 
  National Plan Objectives Timeframe   
1 13th Five Year Plan Football System Reform Action Project 2020   
2 Establishment of a standardized and effective football legal system Sustained   
3 13th Five Year Plan Campus Football Popularization Action Plan 2020   
4 Expansion of coaching and referees and establishment of mechanism for 
healthy development of professional athletes 
Sustained   
5 13th Five Year Plan specialization personnel training plan 2020   
6 Cultivation of comprehensive football industry talent Sustained   
7 13th Five Year Plan Football Stadium Facilities Construction Project 2020   
8 13th Five Year Plan Professional League Promotion Plan 2020   
9 13th Five Year Plan Social Football Training Activities 2020   
10 Development of stadium operations, training, football intermediaries and 
other service markets. 
Sustained   
11 Acceleration of football financial insurance services industry development Sustained   
12 Investigation, development and promotion of China Football League 
sports lottery 
Sustained 
13 13th Five Year Plan Cultivation of Outstanding Football Enterprises 2020   
14 Promotion of the integration of football industry and related industries Sustained   
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15 13th Five Year Plan “Football + Internet” Innovation 2020   
16 Fostering of football culture across China Sustained   
17 Promotion of football “opening-up” (Domestic and International) Sustained   
18 Improvement to Public finance input mechanisms Sustained   
19 Expansion of football industry investment and financing channels Sustained   
20 Diversification of football insurance products including campus, 
disability, personal accident and venue property insurance. 
Sustained   
21 Land use and Planning – Allocation of protection and requirement 
measures for football facilities.  
Sustained   
Source: China National Football Development Plan 2016-2050 (NDRC, 2016a) 
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Table 2: Institutional responsibilities       
Chinese State Institution PRC Ministry Objectives 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission保
监会 
State Council Commission 11, 20 
China National Tourism Administration国家
旅游局 
Government Agency 14 
China Securities Regulation Commission证
监会 
State Council Commission 19 
Chinese Communist Party Propaganda 
Department中央宣传部 
CCP 16 
Local and Provincial Government各级地方
政府 
Provincial/Municipal Govt 18, 21 
Ministry of Civil Affairs民政部 Ministry 1, 9, 
Ministry of Commerce商务部 Ministry 14, 
Ministry of Culture文化部 Ministry 14, 15, 16, 
Ministry of Education教育部 Ministry 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 16, 
17, 18, 20 
Ministry of Finance财政部 Ministry 11, 12, 18, 20 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs外交部 Ministry 17 
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Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development住房城乡建设部 
Ministry 14, 21 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security 
Ministry 6, 
Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology工业和信息化部 
Ministry 13, 15 
Ministry of Land and Resources国土资源部 Ministry 21 
Ministry of Public Security公安部 Ministry 2, 17, 
National Health and Family Planning 
Commission卫生计生委 
State Council Commission 14, 17, 
National Reform and Development 
Commission国家发展改革委 
State Council Commission 7, 14, 16 
Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football 
Reform & Development足改部际联席会议
办公室 
State Council Office ALL 
People’s Bank of China人民银行 Central Bank 19, 
State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce国家工商行政管理总局 
Government Agency 8, 10, 
State Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and Television国家新闻出版广
播电视电影总局 
Government Agency 8, 9, 15, 
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State Administration of Taxation国家税务总
局 
Government Agency 8, 10, 11, 20 
State General Administration of Sport国家体
育总局 
Government Agency ALL (except 11, 
19 and 20) 
Supreme People’s Court最高人民法院 Judiciary 2 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate最高人民检
察院 
Judiciary 2 
Source: National Football Development Plan 2016-2050 (NDRC, 2016a) 
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Table 3: National Specialized Football Schools (全国特色足球学校) 
National Level 
Policy Document Campuses Children 
National Football Plan 
中国足球中长期发展规划 (NDRC, 2016a) 
20,000 30 million 
Provincial & Municipal Level 
Guangdong Province Football Plan (GDDRC, 2017) 
广东省足球中长期发展规划 
1380 3 million 
Hebei Province Football Plan (HBDRC, 2017) 
河北省足球中长期发展规划 
1000 1.5 million 
Gansu Province Football Plan (GSDRC, 2017) 
甘肃省足球中长期发展规划 
357 600,000 
Beijing Overall Football Reform & Development Program 
(BMG, 2017) 
北京市足球改革发展总体方案 
230 200,000 
Chongqing Overall Football Reform & Development Program 
(CQMG, 2016) 
重庆市足球改革发展总体方案 
500 N/A 
Sub-Provincial City Level 
Shenzhen City Football Plan (Guangdong) (SZCG, 2017) 
深圳市足球中长期发展规划 
300 N/A 
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Shijiazhuang City Football Plan (Hebei) (Shijiazhuang Daily, 
2016) 
石家庄市足球改革发展总体方案 
200 N/A 
Lanzhou City Football Plan (Gansu) (Lanzhou Daily, 2016) 
兰州市关于加快发展青年校园足球的实施意见 
130 N/A 
 
